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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBIN LA FOND, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20010970-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of illegal 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second 
degree felony. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1996) . 
STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the officer exceed the scope of the traffic stop 
when, after assessing the totality of the circumstances, he 
inquired whether the occupants had any alcohol or marijuana in 
the vehicle? 
2. Was the officer justified in conducting a limited 
protective frisk where defendant was behaving in a "very evasive" 
and "very nervous" manner and where, despite bulky clothing, she 
had an obvious "bulge" in her right front pocket? 
"The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under 
the deferential clearly-erroneous standard, and the legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of 
discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal 
standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(Utah App. 1956) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
The Utah statute granting peace officers the authority to 
frisk suspects for dangerous weapons states: 
A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the 
person for a dangerous weapon if he 
reasonably believes he or any other person is 
in danger. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second degree felony, 
and one count of possession of paraphernalia, a class B 
2 
misdemeanor (R. 1-2). After a preliminary hearing, she was bound 
over to district court, where she filed a motion to suppress (R. 
15, 17). The district court denied the motion, and defendant 
filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which this Court 
denied (R. 26-28, 89). Defendant then entered a guilty plea to 
the second degree felony, reserving the right to appeal from the 
adverse ruling on the suppression motion (R. 91-98). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison (R. 112-14). This timely appeal followed (R. 115). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the night of March 23, 2001, while patrolling on 1-70, 
Officer Salis of the Utah Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle in 
which defendant was the sole passenger for speeding and a missing 
license plate light (R. 127 at 5). The officer asked the driver 
for his license, registration, and proof of insurance (Id. at 6). 
The driver responded that he did not have a license and that the 
vehicle belonged to defendant. The driver also explained that 
his license had been suspended for driving under the influence 
and that he was eligible to reapply but had not yet done so 
(Id.). Defendant, sitting in the passenger seat, then 
interjected an apology, stating that she should have been 
driving, but that she was tired (Id.). 
At about this time, Officer Salis noticed a purple Crown 
Royal bag with something in it on the front seat between the 
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driver and passenger (Id. at 6, 18) . 
Officer Salis explained that he had stopped the vehicle 
because it was speeding and also because he noticed that a front 
license plate light was out. He then asked defendant for her 
vehicle registration (Id. at 6). According to the officer, prior 
to looking in the glove box for the requested document, defendant 
"was looking on the front seat and looking on the floorboard. 
She then grabbed a brown leather-like, a small coin purse or 
cigarette purse and placed it on the seat in between her legs" 
(Id. at 7). The officer characterized her movement "as if she 
was concealing it" (Id. at 18). 
As defendant was searching for the vehicle registration, the 
officer shone his flashlight towards the glove box. He observed, 
"[T]his whole time, [defendant] was moving very fast, and she was 
going over the glove box and coming out of the glove box and 
appeared very nervous" (Id. at 7). He described her as "more 
nervous than others" (Id. at 17). In the light from the 
flashlight, the officer noticed that "directly below the ashtray 
on the floor of the vehicle was like a console and there was a 
cup holder that was there, and I could see real small green 
particles inside this cup holder" (Id.). Based on his past 
experience, Officer Salis believed the particles to be marijuana 
(IdJ . 
Defendant located the vehicle registration, gave it to the 
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officer, and continued searching quickly and nervously for proof 
of insurance (Id. at 7). While defendant was looking, Officer 
Salis asked both occupants if they had anything illegal in the 
vehicle, including weapons, alcohol, or marijuana (Id. at 8). 
Defendant responded that they did not (Id.). The officer then 
inquired "if, to her knowledge, anyone had smoked marijuana in 
the vehicle recently7' (Id.) . Responding that she did not think 
so, but was not entirely sure, defendant explained that a friend 
had borrowed the car for a week and that she had just picked it 
up that morning. The officer then asked if he could search the 
vehicle for the items about which he had inquired. She consented 
(Id^ ) . 
Officer Salis explained that he would like both defendant 
and then the driver to exit the vehicle in turn. As defendant 
got out of the car, she took "some type of bag" off the seat, as 
well as "a pack of cigarettes and the brown leather bag that was 
on the seat in between her legs" (Id. at 8). Approaching the 
front of the vehicle, defendant put both hands in her pockets. 
Officer Salis described what happened next: 
I then asked her what she had placed in her 
pockets. She stated she did not place 
anything in her pockets. I then asked her to 
remove the bag that she had placed in her 
pocket. At that time, she reached into her 
left front pocket of her pants she was 
wearing and pulled out the brown leather 
purse that she had and had placed it on the 
hood of the car [sic]. At this time I could, 
also, see that the right front pocket was 
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bulging as well. I asked her to remove the 
other bag from that pocket. At that time, 
she stated that she didn't not [sic] have 
anything in the pocket, and she then turned 
and faced away from me. As she faced away 
from me, she put her right hand in her right 
front pocket. At this time I was trying to 
approach her to reach towards the pocket when 
she actually pulled this little - it was a 
black kind of a leather coin purse out of the 
pocket and dropped it on the ground. As I 
saw it drop to the ground, I asked her - I 
immediately picked it up and asked her what 
it was. She stated that she does leather 
work, and that's all she stated. At this 
point she was still being very evasive. She 
did not want me to get close to that pocket. 
I explained that I needed her to just stand 
still, face away from me. She finally 
stopped and held still for a minute. At that 
point I was padding [sic] down the exterior 
of that right front pocket. And while doing 
so, I felt what I believed was a pipe in that 
right front pocket. I asked the female if 
she would remove that object from her pocket, 
which she would not. At that time, I then 
went into the pocket and I pulled out of the 
pocket was [sic] a - a small pocket torch. 
There was also a glass pipe and then a small 
glass jar which contained suspected 
methamphetamine. 
(Id. at 9-10). 
When asked specifically why he chose to pat down defendant, 
Officer Salis responded that defendant was wearing a bulky layer 
of clothing over another layer, her pockets were "bulging," she 
was "very nervous and very evasive, doesn't want to come into 
contact with me," and that he "wanted to first make sure there 
was no weapons" (Id. at 19-20). He also noted that "it's 
possible that she was, also, removing contraband" (Id.). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officer who stopped the vehicle in which defendant was a 
passenger did not unreasonably expand the scope of the traffic 
stop by asking questions about the contents of the car. Under 
the totality of the circumstances, the officer's suspicion of 
criminal activity was supported by the following articulable 
facts. The officer testified that he observed a Crown Royal bag 
with something in it on the front seat of the car, in close 
proximity to the driver, who told him that his license had been 
suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol. The 
officer also observed the passenger grab a small bag and secret 
it between her legs. He further observed a cup containing small 
green particles that he believed were marijuana. Finally, he 
noted defendant's unusually nervous and speedy behavior as she 
responded to his request for documentation. Based on all of 
these observations, asking questions about the presence of drugs 
or alcohol was the least intrusive, most efficient method of 
confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicion of criminal 
activity. The trial court's ruling that the officer properly 
expanded the scope of the stop should, therefore, be affirmed. 
The officer also properly frisked defendant once she was out 
of the car. Contrary to defendant's assertion that she was 
searched rather than frisked, the facts all point to a frisk. 
Where defendant's pocket was bulging, where she was acting 
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evasively, and where the officer carefully confined the scope of 
his action to a limited patdown designed to discover the 
potentially dangerous contents of the single bulging pocket, the 
trial court properly characterized the officer's action as a 
frisk. The frisk was proper because it was based on specific and 
articulable facts that explained why the officer thought 
defendant might pose a danger to him. And once the officer 
frisked defendant and felt a pipe in her pocket, he was justified 
in removing it pursuant to the plain feel doctrine, a corollary 
of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 
Because the trial court properly denied defendant's motion 
to suppress, this Court should affirm her conviction for 




OFFICER SALIS DID NOT EXCEED THE 
SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WHEN, 
AFTER ASSESSING THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, HE INQUIRED WHETHER 
THE OCCUPANTS HAD ANY ALCOHOL OR 
MARIJUANA IN THE VEHICLE 
Defendant argues that the officer who stopped her car for 
speeding and a missing license plate light improperly exceeded 
the scope of that traffic stop when he asked her "questions about 
the contents of the car" (Br. of App. at 12). Specifically, he 
contends that "the trooper had no basis for asking if there was 
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anything illegal, if there were weapons or alcohol or marijuana 
in the car, or if anyone had smoked marijuana in the car 
recently" (Id^ at 12-13)-1 
The law is well-settled that when an officer stops a 
vehicle, the resulting detention "must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Any investigative 
questioning that detains the driver beyond the original purposes 
of the stop "must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more 
serious criminal activity" and must be "based on specific, 
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances 
facing the officer at the time of the stop." State v, Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(citations omitted). 
Reasonable suspicion exists if, from the facts and 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, an officer would 
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). A confluence of factors, then, 
rather than any individual circumstance, will render an officer's 
1
 Defendant sought suppression only of drugs and drug 
paraphernalia. Thus, even had the officer's inquiry about 
weapons constituted error, the error could only be harmless. The 
inquiry, however, appears to be a permissible one. See United 
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 
2 001)(concluding that to permit officers to inquire about the 
presence of weapons during a proper vehicle stop, even in the 
absence of particularized suspicion of personal danger, "will 
promote the government's 'legitimate and weighty' interest in 
officer safety"). 
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experienced suspicion of criminal activity reasonable. State v. 
Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, a reviewing 
court examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding each 
case to determine whether specific and articulable facts exist to 
meet this standard. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 
App. 1994); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
Here, the evidence before the trial court as well as the 
reasonable inferences that the court drew from that evidence 
support the officer's reasonable suspicion that the occupants of 
the vehicle may have been involved in criminal activity. Asking 
them further questions constituted the most expeditious means of 
resolving his concerns. See State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 
(Utah App. 1991)(an officer with reasonable suspicion must 
"diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to 
confirm or dispel [the officer's] suspicions quickly, during 
which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant")(citation 
omitted). 
Early in the traffic stop, when the driver failed to produce 
a license, Officer Salis learned that the license issued to the 
driver had been suspended and that he had a history of driving 
under the influence of alcohol (R. 127 at 6). Shortly 
thereafter, the officer noticed a Crown Royal bag with something 
in it on the front seat between the driver and passenger (Id. at 
6, 18). The confluence of these factors, a bag normally used to 
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contain a bottle of alcohol observed in close proximity to a 
vehicle operator whose license had previously been suspended for 
driving under the influence, underscores the reasonableness of 
some further inquiry into the presence alcohol in the vehicle. 
Shortly thereafter, the officer saw defendant grab a small 
purse and put it on the seat between her legs, a gesture that 
implied to him that she was hiding something (Id. at 7, 18). 
Further, after the officer asked for the vehicle registration and 
defendant began searching for it, the officer noticed a cup in a 
console under the ashtray, containing "real small green 
particles" that he believed were marijuana (Id. at 7) .2 
Defendant's unusual demeanor - her more than normal nervousness 
and the speedy nature of her physical movements - served as an 
overlay to all of the officer's articulated observations, 
underscoring the reasonableness of his decision to inquire 
further about the presence of drugs. 
To follow up quickly on all of his observations and to 
confirm or dispel his suspicions about possible alcohol or drugs 
in the vehicle, the officer reasonably inquired whether the 
subjects had anything illegal in the vehicle. When they 
responded that they did not, the officer specifically asked about 
weapons, alcohol, or marijuana (Id. at 8). That question also 
2
 Because the quantity of the suspected marijuana was so 
small, the officer neither tested it nor considered charging the 
occupants with possession of marijuana (R. 127 at 15-16). 
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elicited a negative response. Still looking to confirm or dispel 
his suspicion about the green particles he had observed and 
seeking as well an explanation that would be consistent with 
defendant's denial, the officer next asked defendant "if, to her 
knowledge, anyone had smoked marijuana in the vehicle recently" 
(Id.). Defendant responded "she did not think so, but she was 
not sure. She said she had lent the car to a male friend of hers, 
and he had borrowed the car for approximately a week, and she had 
just picked the car up that morning" (Id.). 
Explaining why he expanded the scope of the traffic stop by 
asking the questions to which defendant objects, the officer 
testified: 
Well, first of all, just the demeanor of the 
female subject. She was - while I was 
talking to the subject, she was moving very 
fast. She appeared to be very nervous, more 
nervous than others. She kept looking on the 
seat and down on the floor. She picked up a 
brown leather purse and placed it on the seat 
in between her legs, as if she was concealing 
it. There was a Crown Royal bag, which was 
on the seat, which had something in it, which 
I did not know if it was a Crown Royal bottle 
or what was inside of it. The driver was 
holding a large refill cup and his license 
was, also, suspended for a previous DUI. 
While looking or shining my flashlight in 
that direction, I saw what appeared could 
possibly [sic] be marijuana. . . Based on all 
that, I felt I had an obligation to 
investigate further. 
(Id. at 17-18). 
Under these specific circumstances, the trial court properly 
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determined that "the officer had a reasonable basis for 
suspecting that something was amiss, sufficient to justify the 
officer's further inquiry" (R. 27 at addendum A).3 Indeed, not 
only was the officer justified, but also he had a duty to make 
further inquiries. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 
1980)(when reasonable suspicion exists, an officer "has not only 
the right but the duty to make observations and investigations to 
determine whether the law is being violated; and if so, to take 
such measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the 
law")(citation omitted). 
Because the officer articulated the facts upon which he 
based his questioning and because those facts considered as a 
3
 The trial court based this ruling on six relevant 
findings. See R. 27 at addendum A. Defendant takes issue with 
three of the findings, claiming they are clearly erroneous. See 
Br. of App. at 9-10. Defendant's contention is without merit. 
She claims that the first finding contains an improper inference 
because no direct testimony established that her speedy behavior 
was due to stimulant use. See id. at 9. An inference, however, 
is a "logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not presented 
by direct evidence . . .." Black's Law Dictionary 778 (6th ed. 
1990)(emphasis added). Thus, the direct testimony about 
defendant's behavior provided the basis for the trial court's 
inferential finding that her motions ^appeared to be accelerated, 
as if she were under the influence of a stimulant" (R. 27 at 
addendum A)(emphasis added). Such a statement, falling well 
short of a factual finding that defendant's behavior was actually 
the result of stimulant use, does not demonstrate clear error. 
Defendant also claims that two other findings were clearly 
erroneous because they were "misleading." See Br. of App. at 10. 
A plain language reading of the findings at issue, however, 
reveals that only defendant's tortured interpretation of 
straightforward wording can render those findings in any way 
"misleading." 
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totality would prompt a reasonable person to inquire further, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that Officer 
Salis properly expanded the scope of the stop. 
POINT TWO 
OFFICER SALIS CONDUCTED A PROPER 
PROTECTIVE FRISK WHERE DEFENDANT'S 
BEHAVIOR WAS "VERY EVASIVE" AND 
"VERY NERVOUS" AND WHERE THE 
OFFICER OBSERVED THAT, DESPITE 
BULKY CLOTHING, DEFENDANT HAD AN 
OBVIOUS "BULGE" IN HER RIGHT FRONT 
POCKET; THE PLAIN FEEL EXCEPTION TO 
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT JUSTIFIED 
THE OFFICER'S SUBSEQUENT 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF HER POCKET 
Defendant first argues that the trial court incorrectly 
characterized Officer Salis's conduct towards her as a frisk when 
it was, in fact, an improper search, conducted without probable 
cause or exigent circumstances. See Br. of App. at 15-16. 
Second, she argues that even if the officer's conduct consisted 
only of a frisk, he was unjustified in using that technique 
because he did not perceive any danger to his personal safety. 
Id. at 16-17. And, finally, she asserts that even if the frisk 
was justified, it did not provide a legal basis for the officer 
to remove the pipe from defendant's pocket. Id. at 18. All 
three contentions fail. 
First, defendant's argument that she was searched rather 
than frisked was not raised in the trial court and so may only be 
reached pursuant to the plain error doctrine. See Br. of App. at 
14 
1 n.l (relying on plain error to preserve issue for appeal). To 
prevail in a plain error analysis, defendant must demonstrate 
that the trial court erred, that the error should have been 
obvious, and that, absent the error, she had a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). In this case, defendant's argument fails 
from the outset because the trial court did not err when it 
characterized the officer's patdown of defendant as a frisk. See 
R. 2 8 at addendum A. 
Specifically, defendant contends that "because the officer 
required her to identify and produce the contents of her pockets 
from the outset[,] . . . this conduct exceeds a frisk and 
constitutes a search, requiring probable cause and exigent 
circumstances as prerequisites."4 Br. of App. at 15 (citations 
omitted). In essence, defendant seems to be arguing that if an 
officer reasonably believes he might be in danger, he can either 
make inquiries to alleviate his fear or immediately frisk the 
detainee. He cannot, however, first ask questions and then 
frisk, because the questions somehow convert the frisk to a 
search. Defendant offers no legal authority for this novel 
4
 Defendant cites to "R. 12 9 at 9" to support her statement 
that "the officer required her to identify and produce the 
contents of her pockets from the outset." "R. 129", however, 
references the presentence investigation report. The state 
presumes defendant is referring to the preliminary hearing 
transcript, "R. 127." 
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proposition, nor does she offer any rational explanation for why 
it should be so. 
In this case, after the officer asked defendant to exit the 
vehicle, he saw her grab two small bags and a pack of cigarettes 
and then put her hands in her front pockets. Responding to this 
action, he reasonably asked what she had placed there (R. 127 at 
8-9). Defendant denied placing anything in her pockets. (Id. at 
9). Having just observed defendant's actions, the officer asked 
her to remove the bag from her pocket (Id.). Defendant then 
pulled a bag out of her left front pants pocket. The officer saw 
that her right front pocket was still bulging (Id.). See State 
v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)(appearance of suspicious 
bulge in the outer clothing may be a factor indicating that the 
suspect might be armed). When the officer asked defendant to 
remove the other bag, she again denied having anything in the 
bulging pocket and then turned and faced away from the officer. 
As she did so, she put her hand in her right front pocket, pulled 
out a small black purse, and dropped it on the ground. After she 
completed this movement, the officer testified, "she was still 
being very evasive. She did not want me to get close to that 
pocket" (R. 127 at 9). 
With defendant facing away from him so that he could not 
tell if her pocket was still bulging, the officer explained that 
he needed defendant to stand still. She finally complied, and 
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Officer Salis "padded down [sic] the exterior of that pocket" 
(Id.). He testified that he did so primarily to "make sure there 
was no weapons. . ." (Id. at 20). Under these circumstances, 
where her pocket was bulging and where the officer carefully 
confined the scope of his patdown to a minimal intrusion designed 
to discover the contents only of one suspicious pocket, the trial 
court correctly characterized his action as a frisk rather than a 
search. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (characterizing ambit of frisk 
as "limited in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to 
discover . . .[weapons] for the assault of the police officer"); 
State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986)(upholding patdown 
limited to defendant's belt line). 
Second, as to the propriety of the frisk under the 
circumstances here, the trial court ruled, "Even though defendant 
had not been hostile, her movements indicated possible 
concealment of a weapon. An officer may frisk for safety reasons 
whenever there is a reasonable basis for concern, not just when 
it is more likely than not that a weapon is concealed" (R. 2 8 at 
addendum A). Where defendant had already lied to the officer 
twice about the contents of her pockets and where she continued 
to act evasively after removing one object from her right front 
pocket, the trial court's ruling on the legality of the frisk is 
correct. 
Section 77-7-16 of the Utah Code authorizes a police officer 
17 
to frisk a person for dangerous weapons if the police officer 
"reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger." This 
section must be applied in compliance with the constitutional 
mandates of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). State v. Rovbal, 
716 P.2d at 292; see State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 
1985). That is, to obviate the need for a search warrant, an 
officer must have a reasonable belief that the person he is 
frisking may be armed and dangerous. Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 21; 
Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 292. The officer need not be in actual fear 
of harm nor need he be completely certain that the individual is 
armed. But an officer "must be able to point to 'specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" State v. 
White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1993)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21); accord State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1993). 
Fundamentally, "the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 27. 
Here, the officer testified specifically about what prompted 
him to frisk defendant: 
Well, she had removed two bags from the 
vehicle before exiting the vehicle. As she 
was walking towards me, she had both hands in 
her pockets. She was wearing two layers of 
clothes. She was wearing a large pair of 
camouflage pants over other clothing. She, 
also, had a large sweater on. And as she's 
walking towards me, after she removes her 
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hands from her pockets, I could see both of 
her pockets are bulging, and she's also very 
nervous and very evasive, doesn't want to 
come into contact with me. 
(R. 127 at 19-20) . Faced with this situation, the officer wanted 
"to first make sure there was no weapons" (Id. at 20). Because, 
based on the articulated facts, the officer reasonably believed 
defendant might possess a weapon, he was justified in quickly 
frisking the single suspicious pocket to ensure his own safety. 
See State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 1 15, 37 P.3d 270 
(identifying that "facts and circumstances unique to the . . . 
factual context may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect may be armed," thus warranting a frisk). 
When the officer conducted the frisk, however, he did not 
discover a weapon. Rather, he felt the unmistakable contour of a 
pipe in defendant's pocket. Defendant asserts that the officer's 
identification of this non-weapons contraband did not justify his 
subsequent action of reaching into defendant's pocket and 
removing the pipe.5 
Defendant's argument fails. The most direct justification 
for retrieving the drug paraphernalia from defendant's pocket is 
the plain feel doctrine, a corollary of the plain view exception 
5
 The trial court ruled that the evidence so seized was 
admissible, stating that "[o]nce [the officer] frisked defendant, 
the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was 
carrying contraband, and the exigent circumstances are obvious 
here" (R. 2 8 at addendum A). 
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to the warrant requirement. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
366 (1993). Pursuant to the plain feel doctrine, "an object felt 
during an authorized patdown search may be seized without a 
warrant if the item's incriminating character is immediately 
apparent, i.e., if the officer develops probable cause to believe 
that the item felt is contraband before going beyond the 
legitimate scope of the patdown search." People v. Champion, 549 
N.W.2d 849, 856 (Mich. 1996)(adopting plain feel exception to 
warrant requirement); accord State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160 (Wash. 
1994)(same). Probable cause that the pipe was associated with 
criminal activity requires only that the officer reasonably 
believe that the pipe "may be contraband. . . or useful as 
evidence of crime; it does not demand any showing that such 
belief be correct." State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah 
App. 1998)(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 
(1983)(plurality opinion)). 
The facts of this case fall squarely within the plain feel 
exception. Officer Salis testified, "At that point I was padding 
[sic] down the exterior of that right front pocket. And while 
doing so, I felt what I believed was a pipe in that right front 
pocket" (R. 127 at 9). At this juncture, the officer reasonably 
believed that the pipe could be evidence of crime because he knew 
defendant had already lied to him twice about the contents of her 
pockets, because he thought the green particles inside the cup 
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were marijuana, and because defendant continued to behave 
throughout the encounter in an unusually nervous and evasive 
manner. Accordingly, when the officer felt what he immediately 
believed to be a pipe, he had developed the necessary probable 
cause to reach in and remove the contraband. See Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76. 
Where Officer Sails properly seized the pipe that was 
subject to his plain feel and, under the totality of the 
circumstances, was clearly incriminating, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for possession or use of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a second degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f(y day of July, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ROBIN M. LAFOND 
Defendant, 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 0117-56 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Defendant contends that she was stopped on pretextual 
grounds, but concedes that this court lacks authority to overrule 
precedent eliminating a pretextual stop as a basis for 
suppressing evidence. Defendant was stopped for driving 79 miles 
per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone, and for having an unlighted 
license plate. 
The critical issue for decision is whether the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified 
expanding the scope and length of the original stop, and whether 
the search of defendant's pocket was justified by probable cause 
and exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
1 
The State argues that expansion of the original stop was 
justified because: 
1. Defendant's motions appeared to be accelerated, as if 
she were under the influence of a stimulant. 
2. Defendant kept looking at the seat and the floor. 
3. Defendant picked up a brown leather purse and put it 
between her legs as if to conceaJ it. 
4. There was a Crown Royal bag on the seat with something 
in it. 
5. There were green particles in the ashtray that the 
officer thought might be marijuana. 
6. Defendant acknowledged that someone might have used 
marijuana in her vehicle. 
7. Once asked to step out of the vehicle, defendant 
grabbed two bags and put her hands in her pockets, 
causing the officer to believe she might have hidden 
something in her pockets. Her pockets were bulging. 
The Court agrees with the State that, to this point, the 
officer had a reasonable basis for suspecting that something was 
amiss, sufficient to justify the officer's further inquiry. 
Since the officer does not claim that the green particles 
actually were marijuana, only that he thought they could be, and 
2 
because human sight is less subject to suggestion than human 
smell, the rule requiring that marijuana actually be found does 
not apply. An officer who stops a vehicle always has the right 
to require the occupant to step out of the vehicle. 
Defendant also claims that the pat down was an improper 
frisk. The court disagrees. Even though defendant had not been 
hostile, her movements indicated possible concealment of a 
weapon. An officer may frisk for safety reasons whenever there 
is a reasonable basis for concern, not just when it is more 
likely than not that a weapon is concealed. Once he frisked 
defendant, the officer had probable cause to believe that 
defendant was carrying contraband, and the exigent circumstances 
are obvious here. 
The Motion to Suppress is denied. Defendant is ordered to 
appear for trial setting on June 5, 2001, at 9:30 a.m. 
lis /JAAXA Dated this /^LAAlA, day of May, 2001 
R. Anderson,/District Judge 
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